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AFTERWORD:

CRITICAL STRATEGY AND THE JUDICIAL
EVASION OF DIFFERENCE
Kathryn Abramst
Every symposium is a feast of sorts, a fabulous array of tastes and
textures that offer far more than one can possibly consume at a sitting. Participants enjoy a dizzying period of sampling at will and then
settle in for a more extended period of digestion. Viewing the proceedings here in this light, one can only offer compliments to the
chefs. These articles provide a rich and rewarding set of perspectives
on the struggle for equality through law and on the critical theories
that have become central vehicles in that effort. But a good symposium is more than the pleasurable experience invoked by the metaphor of the feast. It is also a crucial occasion for taking stock: a
barometric reading, a finger on the pulse, an infrared snapshot of a
particular domain of law at a specific moment in time. Viewed in this
light, the response occasioned by this gathering is more complicated.
The message communicated by contributors is both exhilarating and
intensely dispiriting. Critical theorists of inequality are offering increasingly sophisticated and illuminating accounts of group-based difference to a judiciary that is differentially but increasingly resistant to
recognizing difference in addressing inequality.' In this Essay, I examine this paradox, particularly as it has been reflected in the contributions to this Symposium, and ask how critical theorists might begin
to meet the challenge it presents. In Part I, I will survey the good
news: how feminist, critical race, and gay and lesbian legal theorists
have enriched legal notions of group-based identity and perspectivity,
helping to reconceptualize the very notion of discrimination. In Part
II, I elaborate the bad news: the judicial flight from the recognition of
difference that I will refer to as "difference evasion." In Part III, I
investigate whether this impasse calls for a shift in normative strategy
t Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. I am grateful to the symposium participants
for the provocative papers that helped me to formulate these ideas and to Sheri Johnson
and Richard Delgado for helpful suggestions on the subject of this Essay.
1 See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,
488 U.S. 469 (1989). For a discussion of this paradox, stemming from a slightly earlier
period, see Kathryn Abrams, Equalityand Impasse: Mobilizingfor Group-BasedChange in an Era
of Group-Blindness, in

REDEFINING

EQUALriy 13 (Neal Devins & Davison M. Douglas eds.,

1998).
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on the part of critical theorists of inequality. First, I will consider a few
efforts at normative repositioning and some of the reasons why critical

theorists of difference have not adopted such repositioning in response to judicial difference evasion as a central goal. I will then argue that, while such repositioning need not comprise the whole
agenda of critical theorists, it offers some advantages in the near term.

Finally, I conclude by offering two sorts of overlapping strategies that
address this goal: one that is appropriate to what Angela Harris has
called the modernist moment in critical theories of inequality2 and
one that is appropriate to the postmodernist 3 moment in those same

theories.
I
RECHARACTERIZING DIFFERENCE AND DISCRIMINATION

The good news, made evident throughout this Symposium, is that
critical theorists are developing increasingly rich and enabling ways to
describe antidiscrimination claimants-whom I will refer to as the
"subjects of inequality"-and the experiences they face. 4 Three features of the papers here reflect increasingly nuanced and illuminating
understandings of the phenomena of inequality.
First, characterizations of difference have attained a comfortable,
if never entirely safe, distance from the shoals of essentialism. 5 Articulating a theory of group-based difference need not entail reifying
2 SeeAngela P. Harris, Forewordu The Jurisprudenceof Reconstruction,82 CAL.L. REv. 741,
743, 750-54 (1994). In this superb article, which has significantly shaped my thinking on
critical theories of inequality, Harris identifies critical race theory as reflecting both the
legacy of civil rights scholarship, with its modernist commitment to "liberation from racism
through right reason," and the legacy of critical legal studies, in whose "postmodern narratives racism is an inescapable feature of western culture, and race is always already inscribed in the most innocent and neutral-seeming concepts." Id at 743.
3 See id. at 743, 745-50.
4 See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CONELL L. REv.
1259 (2000); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, "Gay Rights"For "Gay Whites"?: Race, Sexual Identity and EqualProtection Discourse, 85 CoRELL L. REv. 1358 (2000).
5 For more than a decade, critical theorists of inequality have agreed that reducing
group members to a unitary essence, whether that essence is understood as biologically
instilled or socially constructed, is a hazard to be avoided. See Patricia A. Cain, Feminist
Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories, 4 Bu.RKLmv WOMEN'S LJ. 191 (1989-90) (highlighting
heterosexist assumptions in feminist legal theory); Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Whose Story Is It,
Anyway? Feminist and Antiracist Appropriationsof Anita Hill, in RAcE-iNG JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING PoWER 402 (Toni Morrison ed., 1992) (highlighting race essentialism in feminist legal
theory and gender essentialism in antiracist legal theory); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN.L. REv. 581 (1990) (highlighting race essentialism
in feminist legal theory); Martha R. Mahoney, Whiteness and Women, in Practiceand Theory: A
Reply to CatharineMacKinnon, 5 YALEsJ.L. & FmaNISM 217 (1993) (highlighting race essentialism in feminist legal theory). See generally ELUZABETH V. SPELMAN, INMESSENIAL WOMAN:
PROaLmS OF EXCLUsION IN FEMINIST THOUGr (1988) (identifying several forms of essentialism in feminist theories across multiple disciplines).
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group identity, a "voice of color" or a "woman's voice." 6 The subject
of inequality, whose characterization becomes our window on groupbased difference, manifests a complex identity. This identity is multifaceted, or intersectional, as we see, for example, in Darren Hutchinson's paper. 7 A complex interplay between race, class, and sexual
orientation determines social perception of an individual, that individual's self-perception, and the kinds of discrimination the individual
encounters. Moreover, the way that a subject's identity is articulated,
and the forms of discrimination that the subject confronts, may also
depend upon the context in which the subject finds herself. Think
here of Devon Carbado and Mitu Gulati's paper Working Identity.8 The
discriminatory assumptions that arise, the way in which a subject is
perceived, and the corresponding way in which that subject is required to work her identity, depend on the norms of the particular
workplace and the way these norms intersect with assumptions about
"outsider" identity.
Second, the subjects of inequality are not simply acted upon, but
manifest a partial agency9 which, like their identities more generally,
may vary in its expression in different contexts. The subject of inequality is disadvantaged and constrained; but she is also capable of
making choices within that constraint and resisting stigmatization to
some degree. Working Identity is once again instructive here. The subjects described by Carbado and Gulati have some understanding of
what they may be up against; they are able to make a series of
choices-sometimes useful though often unavailing-about how to
navigate in the face of those constraints. 10
Finally, these developments have begun to change the way critical
theorists characterize notions of discrimination and inequality. Discrimination is not a single kind of act or omission, but rather a network of patterns and relations which will vary for different groups, or
6
There are, however, sophisticated critical theorists whose accounts of the subjects
of inequality veer toward essentialism, either because they understand such subjects in that
way, or because they see practical advantages to a certain strategic essentialism. See, e.g.,
Robin West, Feminism, CriticalSocial Theory and Law, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 59, 95 (arguing
that critical social theory's antiessentialism denies women knowledge of an "antisymbolic,
uncultured, natural, loving, female self").
7 See Hutchinson, supra note 4.
8
Carbado & Gulati, supra note 4.
9 The tendency of legal decision makers to ascribe either too much or too little
agency to the subjects of inequality has been a focus of critique in some of my recent work.
See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, From Autonomy to Agency: Feminist Perspectives on Self-Direction, 40
WM. & MARY"L. REv. 805 (1999) (arguing that liberal philosophers, and liberal legal decision makers, ascribe too much autonomy to the often-constrained female subjects of inequality); Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal Theory, 95
COLUM. L. Rxv. 304 (1995) (arguing that dominance feminists, and legal decision makers
in some kinds of cases, ascribe too little agency to the female subjects of inequality).
10 See Carbado & Gulati, supranote 4, at 126-67.
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for the same group in different contexts." Perhaps more importantly, discrimination or inequality is consistent with the resistance of
the target; indeed, it may be readily glimpsed in the context of that
resistance. A subject who actively resists, who carefully negotiates his
identity in an effort to avoid unequal treatment, can still be suffering
discrimination. As Carbado and Gulati suggest, the amount of identity "work" that the subject of inequality must do' 2 in order to avoid
stigmatizing or unequal treatment is often a measure of, or even an
13
accurate manner of characterizing, the discrimination she faces.
II
JUDICIAL EVASION OF DIFFERENCE

If the good news proclaimed by this Symposium concerns the enrichment and transformation of critical accounts of inequality, the
bad news concerns the judicial response. Contributors describe an
almost paradoxical judicial response to the increasingly varied and sophisticated accounts of what it means to be the subject of group-based
discrimination. Despite the intellectual advances, courts increasingly
resist-I might more accurately say evade' 4-group-based analysis.
11 See Kathryn Abrams, Title VII and the Complex Female Subject; 92 McH. L. Rzv. 2479
(1994) (criticizing much recent Title VII law as reflecting the assumption that discrimina-

tion means manifesting the attitude that "we don't like you because you're an X" and
arguing that acknowledging the complexity of legal subjects requires acknowledging discrimination as a more complex and variable phenomenon).
12 See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 4, at 1267-70 (comparing identity work that must
be done by outsiders with identity work that must be done by more privileged employees).
13 See id.
14 I am grateful to Martha Mahoney for reminding me that Ruth Frankenberg also
uses the term "evasion" to describe resistant responses to a politics of race-based difference. See RuTH FRANKENBERG, WHrrE WoMEN, RACE MATRs: THE SocIAL CONSTRUCTION

OF WHMNMss passim (1993). Frankenberg, in fact, uses two terms, "color evasion" and
"power evasion" to describe responses to the politics of racial difference. Id. at 142, 149.
Frankenberg analogizes color evasion to color-blindness: "[I]t is a mode of thinking about
race organized around an effort to not 'see,' or at any rate not to acknowledge, race differences .... " &eLat 142. She describes power evasion as a strategy of "dividing the discursive
terrain into areas of 'safe' and 'dangerous' differences, 'pleasant' and 'nasty' differences,
and generating modes of talking about difference that evaded questions of power." Id. at
149. Frankenberg offers as one example of power evasion an interviewee's statement that
"I don't care if he's Black, brown, yellow, or green," noting that this phrase "camouflages
socially significant differences of color in a welter of meaningless ones." I. The judicial
patterns of thought that I will describe as "difference evasion" combine elements of each of
Frankenberg's strategies. See infraPart III.B. Difference evasion takes color-blindness as its
ultimate goal and, as a means of effectuating that goal under present circumstances, aims
to deny the differences that social constructions of race create. However, judicial difference evasion is also power evasive in the sense that when judges employing this strategy are
directly confronted with evidence of or arguments about racial difference (as by parties in
a race-conscious remedies case), they will deny that race in fact has any contemporary
social significance and may also argue that recognizing race as a basis of difference will
confer upon it a social significance of a negative and potentially divisive sort. See, e.g., Shaw
v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993); Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
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Martha Mahoney makes this observation in the context of housing discrimination and the Walker v. City of Mesquite case. 15 Critical theories
of inequality have permitted advocates to describe housing discrimination trends in new ways and to seek more appropriate and novel remedies, such as mobility remedies in the housing context.
Unfortunately, these new descriptions and remedies are often summarily rejected by the courts. 16 This paradox also informs the observation made by Julie Nice about the antinomies of equal protection:
notwithstanding the contributions of critical theorists, courts increasingly resolve these antinomies in favor of the more conservative
17
pole.
Confronted with these observations, one might well ask whether
there ever was a golden age of critical theoretical efficacy, when courts
embraced at least some critical insights about group-based difference.
If we understand this question to ask whether critical theorists of inequality ever enjoyed broad acceptance among the courts, the answer is
probably no. The insights of critical theorists frankly contest the dominant assumptions of the mainstream legal theories that inform inequality doctrine, from the posture of neutrality and objectivity
ascribed to judges to the pre-social formation and unitary character
ascribed to legal subjects. 18 Moreover, many strains of critical theory--I think here of some forms of critical race theory and gay and
lesbian legal theory-appear to have been catalyzed or redirected by
the ascendance of abstract, group-blind reasoning in American law. 19
However, there were periods in the past when specific assumptions
now associated widely with critical theorists of inequality made occasional, if not consistent, appearances in antidiscrimination law. The
doctrinal debates over discriminatory effect or discriminatory intent,
over group-based or individually-based constructions of equal protec15

See Martha R. Mahoney, Whiteness and Remedy: Under-RulingCivil Rights in Walker v.

Mesquite, 85 CORNEL. L. REv. 1309 (2000) (discussing Walker v. City of Mesquite, 169 F.3d
973 (5th Cir. 1999)).

16 See id. at 1309.
17 SeeJulie A. Nice, Equal Protection'sAntinomies and the Promise of a Co-Constitutive Approach, 85 CORNELL L. REv. 1392, at 1410 (2000) ("The bird's eye view of these antinomies
reveals a second apparent pattern: a hierarchical arrangement prioritizing the conservative
preference over the progressive one. This is so even though progressive scholars and litigators brilliantly have articulated compelling arguments on behalf of the progressive
preferences.").
18 For a comprehensive, if perhaps extreme, discussion of this distance from the traditional liberal perspective, see DANIEL FARBa & SUZANA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE
RADICAL ASSAULT ON TtrrsH IN AMERICAN LAw (1998).
19 For example the Michigan Law Review issue that first explored the role of legal
storytelling was published in 1989, immediately following City of Richmond v.JA. Croson Co.,
488 U.S. 469 (1989); several of the contributors in that landmark compilation used storytelling to challenge the assumptions of that opinion. See Symposium, Legal Storytelling 87
MIcH L. REv. 2073 (1989).
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tion-now largely resolved, as Julie Nice reminds us, in favor of the
latter terms20-reflect at least the inclusion of what we would now call
critical perspectives 2 ' in central doctrinal debates. Moreover, fuller
appreciation of group-based difference has prevailed in a few areas of
gender discrimination law. In a Title VII action for sexual harassment, the conceptual structure of the basic claim acknowledges power
inequalities between men and women,2 2 and some courts have even
embraced gender-differential (or other group-differential) approaches to assessing the pervasiveness of harassment.2 3 And crimes
involving sexualized violence are another area in which legislatures
have often been willing to frame statutes, and courts have been willing
24
to analyze them, in gender-specific terms.
More recently, however, even this partial confluence has sharply
diminished. The growing distance between the critical commentators
and the courts has been particularly conspicuous in the constitutional
context of affirmative action, a central focus of critical race theory; but
it has begun to infect other areas as well. The features of what I will
call "difference evasion"-the judicial approach that has fueled this
growing distance-have been vividly, and painfully, illustrated by papers in this Symposium.
The recent equal protection retreat provides the most familiar,
and most important, example ofjudicial difference evasion.2 5 Federal
See Nice, supra note 17, at 1394-96.
These more progressive alternatives in antidiscrimination law were not always
framed as critical theorists would later frame them. For example, while courts in the mid1970s argued about discriminatory effect and discriminatory intent, the few theorists who
were then addressing inequality law with a broad critical lens, such as Derrick Bell and
20
21

Alan Freeman, wrote about the perpetrator's perspective (implicit in discriminatory effect)
and the victim's perspective (implicit in discriminatory intent). See, e.g., Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of
Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN.L. REv. 1049 (1978). See generally Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Sensing Two Masters: IntegrationIdeals and ClientInterests in School DesegregationLitigation,85 YALE
L.J. 470 (1976) (analyzing school integration remedies from perspective of black
plaintiffs).
22

See, e.g., CATHARINE MAcKiNNON, THE SExuAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 1-

23 (1979).
23 See, e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991) (applying the "reasonable woman" standard to determine pervasiveness of harassment); see also Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998) (holding that pervasiveness should be
analyzed from the perspective of the "reasonable person in the plaintiff's position, considering 'all the circumstances'" (citation omitted)).
24 Gender-specificity in this area, however, has not been an unequivocally positive
development. See Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 476 (1981) (upholding
gender-specific statutory rape statute against equal protection challenge). Moreoverjudicial solicitude toward statutes targetting sexualized violence may be more tenuous than
feminist theorists had hoped. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 120 S.Ct. 1740 (2000)
(holding that Congress lacked constitutional authority to enact civil remedy provision of
the Violence Against Women Act).
25 See, e.g., Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 948 (1996) (rejecting diversity as a compelling state interest).
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courts have increasingly rejected group-based remedies for discrimination, because judicial understandings of group-based difference,
and, correspondingly, judicial definitions of discrimination, have
themselves begun to change. Courts rarely uphold remedies premised on the contributions of group-based identity because they do
not view group-based identity as shaping one's perspective or contributing to one's ability to make meaning in a social or institutional setting.2 6 Instead, courts are concerned about the potential damage
done by characterizing individuals as group members. 27 Prima facie
discrimination in the equal protection area has increasingly been defined as governmental action which classifies someone as a member of
a group, rather than treating him as an unmarked individual.28 This
change is what Julie Nice refers to when she talks about the judicial
shift in focus from class to classification. 29 For courts, it is no longer

important whether the purpose or effect of that classification on those
so classified is ameliorative or hurtful. 30 Consequently, what we used
to call "remedy" (for discrimination against a class) is increasingly being identified by the courts as "violation" (of a more abstract prohibition on governmental classification).
However, as Tracy Higgins and Laura Rosenbury warn, this kind
of group-blind conceptualization of discrimination has begun to escape the confines of the Equal Protection Clause. 3 1 The courts have
begun to use equal protection analysis to limit race-conscious remedies
in statutory settings such as the Voting Rights Act, settings which have
explicitly group-based conceptual foundations. Moreover, as Higgins
and Rosenbury note, the courts have begun to apply the same groupblind reasoning that has animated the equal protection area, to liability decisions in other contexts, such as Title VII.3 2 Difference evasion
in these contexts, which involve private actors, cannot even be buttressed by the ostensible justification of governmental neutrality toward various group-based identities.
26 See id.; see also Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274-76 (1986) (rejecting "role model" theory as a compelling state interest).
27 See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 648-49 (1993) (stating that treating voters as
racial group members not only insults their individuality, but may foster racial antagonisms
and encourage representatives to believe that their obligations run only to those of their
race).
28 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); Shaw, 509 U.S. at 630;
City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
29 See Nice, supra note 17, at 20-23.
30
See Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (concluding that it is impossible to tell whether a governmental classification is actually "benign" without subjecting it to strict scrutiny).
31
See Tracy E. Higgins & Laura A. Rosenbury, Agency, Equality, and Antidiscrimination
Law, 85 CoRNL L. REv. 1194, 1201-13 (2000).
32 See id
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Perhaps the most invidious development has occurred in the Title VII liability context: the courts have deployed critical theorists'
nuanced tools of description against those theorists' very antidiscrimination goals. In some cases, courts seem to acknowledge descriptive themes, such as variability in identity and individual efforts at
self-direction. However, in many of these contexts, judges use these
nuanced accounts, not to render a more complex picture of groupbased identity, but to deny that group members have suffered discrimination. Consider, for example, the lack-of-interest defense described
34
by Higgins and Rosenbury,3 3 and also examined by Vicki Schultz.
For this defense, the courts use the choices made by some individuals
within a plaintiff group to counter the claim of discrimination raised
by group members, neglecting the extent to which individual choices
may be a response to elements of a discriminatory environment. 35
Consider also Devon Carbado's and Mitu Gulati's disturbing observation that courts may be more reluctant to recognize group-based discrimination in cases where outsiders used workplace "comfort
36
strategies" to mitigate their exposure to stigmatizing stereotypes.
These varied forms ofjudicial difference evasion make clear that critical analyses of difference and group-based discrimination-illuminating though they may be-are not being embraced by mainstream
judicial decision makers.
III
CONFRONTING THE IMPASSE: NEW DIRECTIONS IN
CRITICAL STRATEGY

Critical theorists may feel, as I do, that responsibility for this impasse lies with the courts: specifically, with their myopic view of discrimination and group-difference. The judiciary's neglect of-if not
outright resistence to-a body of work offering profound and illuminating reconceptualizations of equality under law is inexplicably shortsighted. It would seem to underscore the judiciary's ideological
33

See id. at 1207.

34

See Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: judicialInterpretationsof Sex

Segregation in the Workplace in Title V CasesRaising the Lack of InterestArgumen 103 HAv. L.
REv. 1749, 1752-54 (1990).
35
See id. at 1757 ("An interpretation that portrays women as having formed their job

preferences before they ever enter the workworld renders invisible all the ways in which
employers disempower women from claiming nontraditional jobs.").
36 See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 4, at 1292 n.92 (noting that when plaintiffs use
comfort strategies to mitigate their exposure to stigmatizing stereotypes associated with
outsider group membership, courts may conclude that they could not have suffered discrimination because they were not viewed by defendants as members of an outsider
group).
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37
Yet
investment in, or structural support of, the racial status quo.

critical theorists have rarely taken judicial evasion of their insights as
an explicit point of departure; we have rarely asked what effect the
courts' refusal to learn from our arguments should have on our future
theoretical work. There are, of course, exceptions to this pattern. For
instance, Derrick Bell argues in Racial Realism that claims to racial
equality directed at the courts have ceased to serve the interests of
people of color, particularly African Americans; minorities should recognize that equality through and under law is unattainable and redirect their efforts toward more contextually-based and individual
resistance struggles that have their own political and dignitary rewards.3 8 Other critical theorists, such as Julie Nice,3 9 have proposed
that we try new discursive strategies that are less directly implicated in
the courts' dichotomous, or antinomous, modes of thought. 40 For the
most part, however, the judiciary's utter failure to engage with critical
theorists' recent insights remains a mere subtext, rather than an explicit subject of discussion. Why this has been the case and what might
be gained by revisiting this question are worthwhile questions to
consider.
A. Underplaying the Impasse: Contributing Factors
While there is unlikely to be any one correct answer to this question, there are a range of partially-illuminating possibilities. Critical
theorists may have failed concertedly to address judicial neglect of
their insights because they are differently situated with respect to recent patterns of judicial difference evasion. Critical theories of inequality have not been neglected across the board; rather there has
been group-specific variation and context-specific variation, which
may have complicated the prospects of coalescence around this question. Feminists who avoid explicitly raising race or sexual orientation
issues in their work may experience a warmer judicial reception than
other critical colleagues in certain statutory contexts. Difference evasion has not taken hold in cases interpreting some statutes, such as
Title VII claims of sexual harassment, in which the conceptual struc37
Indeed, judicial evasion of difference has spawned an increasingly intense critique,
with some critics claiming that difference evasion was predictable, if not inevitable. See,
e.g., Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CoNN. L. REv. 363 (1992) (arguing that it is necessary
to recognize the equality claims no longer serve interests of racial minorities); Guardeau
Spann, PurePolitics,88 MicH. L. REv. 1971 (1990) (arguing that the Supreme Court serves
veiled majoritarian interest at expense of racial minorities).
38 Bell, supra note 37, at 373-78 (arguing that legal realism permits courts to disguise
and manipulate concepts of racial equality, thus covertly perpetuating the inequities of the
formalistic model ofjurisprudence).
39 See Nice, supra note 17.
40
See id. at 1412-18 (exploring the benefits of a "co-constitutive" approach to equal
protection analysis).
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ture of the basic claim acknowledges power inequalities between men
and women. 41 Moreover, constitutional claims for women's equality
frequently involve basic institutional exclusion, for which even a difference evasive approach does not foreclose recovery.42 Intersectionality remains problematic, however, as do feminist claims about group43
based characteristics that are variable across contexts.
Gay and lesbian legal theorists rightly celebrate their conspicuous
victory in Romer v. Evans.44 Yet, this decision may not reflect the victory of critical perspectives on sexual orientation so much as the success of a legal "comfort" strategy: the Supreme Court was willing to
strike down a broadly and dramatically prejudicial state enactment, so
long as it could avoid framing its opinion around an explicit acknowledgement of gay and lesbian difference or disadvantage. 45 In other
41
See MACKINNON, supranote 22, at 1-25. Some courts have even embraced genderdifferential (or other group-differential) interpretive approaches to the application of the
statute, thus inhibiting difference evasion. See, e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th
Cir. 1991) (applying the "reasonable woman" standard to determine pervasiveness of sexual harassment); see also Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998)
(holding that pervasiveness should be analyzed "from the perspective of the reasonable
person in the plaintiff's position, considering 'all the circumstances'" (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993))). Criminal acts involving sexualized violence are
another area in which legislatures frame statutes, and courts analyze them, in gender-specific terms, although not in an unequivocally positive way. See Michael M. v. Superior
Court, 450 U.S. 464, 472-73 (1981) (plurality opinion) (upholding a gender-specific statutory rape statute against equal protection challenge).
42
See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (invalidating exclusion of
women from state military college on grounds that generalizations about men and women
should not bar women from beneficial experiences if at least some women are able to avail
themselves of such experiences); J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (striking down
gender-based peremptory challenges on ground that gender does not make for reliable
differences of opinion and gender-based exclusions involve unacceptable stereotypes). To
my mind, Justice Blackmun's majority opinion in JE.B., which denies salient differences
between men and women and also invokes the negative history and effect of stereotypes,
reflects some elements of difference evasion. See id. at 135-47. Justice O'Connor, one of
the leading difference evaders in the context of race, calls attention to Justice Blackmun's
evasion in her concurrence. See id. at 149 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg's
approach in Virginia, on the other hand, does not strike me as difference evasive; she relies
on the damaging history of stereotypes about women to reject the state's gender-based
generalizations, and she also argues that there are women who, factually speaking, are
indistinguishable from men and so should not necessarily be foreclosed from participation. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 519-58. However, the starkly different factual contexts in race
and gender cases make precise comparisons between them a complicated undertaking.
For a provocative view of Justice Ginsburg's Virginia opinion and other equal protection
cases involving women, see Mary Anne Case, "The Vey Stereoiypethe Law Condemns: Constitutional Sex DiscriminationLaw as a Quest for Perfect Proxies,85 CoRNEL. L. Rxv. 1447 (2000).
43
For a more extensive description of judicial difficulties in acknowledging such
characterizations of difference in one statutory context, see Abrams, supranote 11.
44
517 U.S. 620 (1996) (striking down Colorado's Amendment 2, which precluded
the state and its subdivisions from passing laws or ordinances protecting the equal rights of
gays, lesbians, or bisexuals).
45
I describe this advocacy strategy, reflected most prominently in the apparently influential brief by Laurence Tribe, see Amicus Curiae Brief at 3-7, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S.
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areas-including Fourteenth Amendment privacy claims4 6 and equal
protection challenges to the exclusion of gays and lesbians from the
military4 7-courts are far from accepting critical theories, even as a
justification for ending facial discrimination. Moreover, multidimensional analysis of gay and lesbian identity, as Darren Hutchinson reminds us,48 remains beyond the pale.
The area of racial difference, of course, reflects the increasingly
frank rejection of critical insights, which many of this Symposium's
most discouraging observations point out. The differential judicial
treatment of critical theories, across group and context, may have impeded perception of the growing impasse between courts and critical
theorists, and may have complicated coalition and response even
49
among those who have perceived it.
Furthermore, some critical commentators who have observed this
impasse may have found it strategically and epistemologically dubious
to focus explicitly upon it. Critical theorists of inequality, like any
scholarly movement that strives for influence, may be properly reluctant to advertise a cool reception by even one target audience.5 0
Moreover, as a theoretical matter, a major goal of critical scholarship
in this area has been to shift the epistemological center of gravity away
from the perspective of privileged legal actors and toward the vantage
point of "outsider" groups.5 1 To focus specifically on the impasse,
620 (1996) (No. 94-1039), as a "comfort strategy" because, like the comfort strategies de-

scribed by Devon Carbado & Mitu Gulati in Working Identity, see supra note 4, at 1301-04, it
permitted gay and lesbian advocates to function in an unreceptive environment which they
did not control-an environment created by previous Court cases, particularly Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)-by refraining from calling attention to, or even effacing,
aspects of their clients' group-based difference. I use "comfort strategy," as do Carbado
and Gulati, in an analytic and descriptive sense to emphasize the burdens imposed on
'outsiders" in unequal, hierarchical institutional settings, and not in any pejorative way.
46
See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 186.
47
See, e.g., Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989); Steffan v. Cheney, 780
F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1991).
48
See Hutchinson, supranote 4.
49
For example, those scholars, such as feminist theorists, who have enjoyed a more
mixed reception from the courts, may be more ambivalent about highlighting disparities
between their theoretical positions and the courts' pronouncements, for fear of exacerbating disparities of perspective that already exist. Or perhaps their partial victories may have
made it more difficult for them to see the ways in which women-of all races and sexualities-are directly implicated in the questions of intersectionality, on which the courts have
been far less responsive. See generally Elizabeth M. Iglesias & Francisco Valdes, Religion,
Gender, Sexuality, Race and Class in Coalitional Theory: A Critical and Self-Critical Analysis of
Latrit SocialJusticeAgendas, 19 CHIcMNo-LTINo L. REv. 503, 555 (1998) (decrying the
failure of some leading white feminists to address problems facing nonwhite women).
50 Of course, the impasse need not be characterized as a complete rejection, but also
could be depicted as a correctable error or temporary setback.
51
Some scholars make this epistemological point explicitly. See, e.g., Mar Matsuda,
Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MicH. L. REv. 2320 (1989).
Other scholars simply present their critiques from this vantage point (sometimes in discursively unconventional ways, such as through the use of personal narrative) and assume that
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rather than critiquing the courts from the outsiders' perspective,
might seem to shift that center of gravity back toward those with institutional and group-based privilege.
Finally, critical theorists may differ over whether judicial difference evasion warrants acknowledgment, let alone a tactical change.
Here, the division may be less drastic among different group-based
branches of critical theory than among those who disagree over
whether to take a modernist or a postmodernist position. 52 Modernists retain the rationalist hope that inequality can be substantially ameliorated, if not wholly abolished, through the application of right
reason. They are therefore likely to be dismayed and frustrated by the
failure of courts to heed critical scholars' messages. Postmodernists,
on the other hand, see inequality as a consequence, not of faulty reasoning, but of complex and deeply-entrenched social structures. Because postmodernists regard reason itself (along with neutrality and
merit) as infused with the perspectives of the privileged, they are less
likely to be surprised by the courts' failure to respond to reasoned
readers will make the fairly obvious epistemological inference. See, e.g, PATRIClAJ. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991).
52 I am grateful to Angela Harris for encouraging me to think about distinctions
among critical theorists of inequality in this way. See Harris, supra note 2, at 743 (pointing
out the tension between modernist and postmodernist views on critical race theory).
There are many ways to distinguish modernism and postmodernism. See, e.g., FRANcois LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION at xxiv (Geoff Bennington & Brian Massumi
trans., Univ. Minn. Press 1984) ("I define postmodern as incredulity toward metanarratives.
This incredulity is undoubtedly a product of progress in the sciences: but that progress in
turn presupposes it. To the obsolescence of the metanarrative apparatus of legitimation
corresponds, most notably, the crisis of metaphysical philosophy and of the university institution .... ."); Seyla Benhabib, Feminism and Postmodernism:An Uneasy Alliance, in FEMINIsr
CONTENTIONS 18 (Seyla Benhabib et al. eds., 1995) (listing "death of man," "death of history," and "death of metaphysics" as the central tenets of strong postmodernism). For
purposes of this essay, I follow Angela Harris in placing my emphasis on a distinction between adherence to and skepticism about the Enlightenment view of reason as a crucial
tool for ameliorating inequality. See Harris, supra note 2, at 749. Interpreted in this way,
the distinction between modernism and postmodernism covers some of the same terrain as
the distinction between structuralism and poststructuralism. The latter distinction focuses
on the processes of social construction through which human subjects, and unequal relations among them, are formed. Poststructuralism (as compared with structuralism) emphasizes the variety, complexity, and contingency of the discursive influences that shape
subject formation. Some poststructuralists also emphasize the diffusion of the "political":
the range of sites from which dominant social formations and meanings can be resisted.
Postmodernism and poststructuralism share an antifoundationalism and a suspicion of liberal assumptions such as epistemological objectivism or largely unencumbered human autonomy. However, if one reads postmodernism as post- or antirationalism, and
poststructuralism as a complex, contingent view of subject formation and power relations,
then it is possible to have postmodernists who are not poststructuralists (and vice versa).
Derrick Bell, with his emphasis on the magnitude and persistence of racial inequality,
might be an example. See, e.g., Bell, supra note 37. Vicki Schultz, with her carefully reasoned appeals to courts to embrace discrete poststucturalist insights, is a poststructuralist
who is not postmodernist. See, e.g., Schultz, supra note 34.
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argument. 53 Far from providing a salient wake-up call, the current
impasse might seem to these critics to affirm their views about the
deep entrenchment of inequality and the difficulties of seeking
change through narrow institutional approaches. Yet despite their
differences in perspective, I suspect that it would benefit critical theorists of inequality as a group to take the current impasse as an occasion for new strategizing. Theorists could then interrogate the
impasse in hopes of finding a more productive legal strategy or shifting the critical focus to extra-legal contexts, depending on the assumptions of the critics in question. In the remainder of this Essay, I
consider two sets of strategies: one for modernists who believe this
impasse might be resolved through better, or better-targeted, argumentation about the dynamics of difference, and another for
postmodernists, who could use it as an instrument for underscoring
the systemic character of the problem and the error of focusing exclusively on courts, as opposed to addressing broader social and cultural
contexts.
B.

Modernist Strategies

If, as modernists, critical theorists believe that difference evasion
and the growing analytic distance between courts and critical commentators can be ameliorated, we might profitably take this distance
as an explicit subject of investigation. In particular, we could think
more precisely about what beliefs, commitments, or mental habits underwrite the judicial investment in the evasion of difference and how
we can begin to change them.
What factors explain judicial evasion of group-based difference?
The answer is clearly complicated, but several categories may be worth
considering. One set of answers lies in the realm of what we might
call psychological explanations. Angela Harris's observation about essentialism also holds true of difference evasion: it is a comforting bul54
wark against the daunting multiplicity presented by difference.
Courts find refuge in the unity and abstraction of the phrase 'cWe the
People" because they are frightened by the boundless particularity of
Borges's Funes the Memorious. 55 If one is tempted to dismiss this thesis as mere speculation, one need only survey those opinions that have
53
See Harris, supra note 2, at 745-50 ("Postmodernist thought refuses to accept any
concept, linguistic usage, or value as pure, original, or incorruptible. Postmodernist narratives, as used by race-crits, contend that concepts like neutrality and objectivity, and institutions like law, have not escaped the taint of racism, but rather are often used to perpetuate
it.").
54 See Harris, supra note 5, at 605-06.
55 Id. at 581-83 (discussing judicial and theoretical management of the tension between "We the People" and Funes the Memorious, the Borges character who remembered
every detail of his past experience).
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moved the judiciary toward difference evasion. In Justice Powell's Regents of the University of California v. Bake5 6 opinion, for example, one
finds a vivid image of this kind of panic in the face of pluralism. The
United States, Powell notes, has become:
a Nation of minorities. Each had to struggle-and to some extent
struggles still-to overcome the prejudices not of a monolithic majority, but of a "majority" composed of various minority groups of
whom it was said-perhaps unfairly in many cases-that a shared
57
characteristic was a willingness to disadvantage other groups.
A daunted judiciary seems to be suggesting that it is easier to cast its
lot with a unitary conception of an unmarked human nature than to
determine how to parse, and adjudicate in the face of, such pluralistic
complexity. As Justice Powell continues in Bakke.
There is no principled basis for deciding which groups would merit
"heightened judicial solicitude" and which would not. Courts
would be asked to evaluate the extent of the prejudice and consequent harm suffered by various minority groups. Those whose societal injury is thought to exceed some arbitrary level of tolerability
then would be entitled to preferential classifications at the expense
of individuals belonging to other groups. Those classifications
would be free from exacting judicial scrutiny. As these preferences
began to have their desired effect, and the consequences of past
discrimination were undone, new judicial rankings would be
58
necessary.
The same anxiety can be glimpsed in cases where plaintiffs make
claims of intersectional identity. One court confronting a Title VII
plaintiff's demand that it recognize the intersectional category of race
and gender responded with telling, if arbitrary, candor, stating that it
could recognize no more than two such categories:
The difficulty with [an intersectional] position is that it turns employment discrimination law into a many-headed Hydra, impossible
to contain with Title VII's prohibition. Following [the intersectional model] to its extreme, protected subgroups would exist for
every possible combination of race, color, sex, national origin and
religion. It is questionable whether any employer could make an
employment decision under such a regime without incurring a volley of discrimination charges. For this reason, analysis is appropriately limited to employment decisions based on one protected,
immutable trait or fundamental right, which are directed against
individuals sharing a second protected, immutable characteristic.
The benefits of Title VII thus will not be splintered beyond use and
56
57
58

438 U.S. 265 (1978) (plurality opinion).
Id. at 292 (citations omitted).
Id. at 296-97.

1440

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85:1426

recognition; nor will they be constricted and unable to reach discrimination based on the existing unlawful criteria. 59
Beyond the reflexive distancing of pluralist panic, there are also
more principled grounds we might describe as philosophical explanations. A good window on these arguments is provided in Rosenbury's
and Higgins's Article. 60 Recognition of difference and the kinds of
remedies that it entails seem to fly in the face of a particular conception of the liberal government: one that envisions government as limited, and one that is wary of any action that might cause it to violate its
putative neutrality toward different groups of citizens. Yet, as Linda
McClain's contribution makes clear, there are many accounts of liber61
alism that courts could draw on beyond the neutral conception.
Nevertheless, the account that Rosenbury and Higgins identify is a
mainstream version with a real hold on the political and judicial imagination of this country.
Finally, there are what we might calljurisprudential explanations.
As Pierre Schlag has observed, the legal subject is, in many ways, a
reflection of the judicial subject.6 2 The terms in which judges de-

scribe subjects before the law reflect, in important respects, the ways
in which judges see, or want to see, themselves. Acknowledging difference-acknowledging the importance of group membership to one's
identity and experiences-means calling into question the traditional
norms of good judging, namely, the ability to see subjects without affiliation or particularized, constitutive identity.63 In the first part of his

confirmation hearings, Justice Thomas spoke about "stripping down
like a runner" to prepare for his judicial role.64 Of course, it would be
easier for judges if there were not too many constitutive elements of
identity to strip off. Acknowledging group-based difference in the
legal context raises questions about difference and its jurisprudential
ramifications that most judges would prefer not to answer.
This list is daunting, to be sure; however, it does not leave us without resources in our effort to address the judicial impasse. In fact,
merely by articulating these factors, we can see a number of possible
remedies-some already in progress and others yet to be initiated59 Judge v. Marsh, 649 F. Supp. 770, 780 (D.D.C. 1986) (citation omitted).
60 See Higgins & Rosenbury, supra note 31, at 1198-1203.
61 See Linda C. McClain, Toward a FormativeProject of SecuringFreedom and Equality, 85
ComLL L. REv. 1221, 1249-57 (2000).
62 See Pierre Schlag, The Problem of the Subject, 69 TEx. L. REv. 1627, 1628 (1991).
63 For examples of articles that both frame and interrogate this premise, see Sherrilyn
Ifill, RacialDiversity on the Bench: Beyond Role Models and Public Confidence, 57 WAsH. & LEE L.
RIv. 1 (forthcoming 2000); Martha Minow, StrippedDown Like a Runner orEnrichedBy Experience: Bias and Impartiality ofJudges and Jurors,33 Wm.& MARY L. Rxv. 1201 (1992); Judith
Resnik, On the Bias: FeministReflections of the Aspirationsfor OurJudges, 61 S. CAt_ L. REv.
1877 (1988).
64
See Minow, supra note 63, at 1201.
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that may help courts think more clearly about questions of difference.
First, we might seek to mitigate negative psychological factors by, for
example, approaching judges in a context outside the courtroom.
Martha Minow and others have created an innovative set of judicial
trainings through the "Doing Justice" program at Brandeis. 65 Minow
seeks to have judges discuss critical insights about group-based difference in a context where they can absorb ideas about difference without immediately having to act upon them. 6 6 She reports that not
infrequently she sees breakthroughs: judges acknowledging the significance of complex, group-based identity in a way that they would not
have done in the context of a case. 67 It is her hope that, with sufficient exposure and discussion, judges might utilize these insights in
adjudicative contexts. 68 We might address the philosophical factors
by focusing on new or alternative ways to conceive of the liberal project. Ifjudges cease to interpret liberalism as requiring an ineluctably
limited, non-affirmative government and absolute neutrality towards
citizens' varied goals, recognition of difference will become easier.
This, I believe, is at least part of what animates Linda McClain's belief
in an affirmative governmental responsibility to provide all groups
with the preconditions for deliberative participation, particularly for
groups whose prior inequality may have made those preconditions
hard to come by.69 Finally, we can address the jurisprudential factors
by carefully exploring the terrain between the stripped down runner
and the traditionalist's nightmare of uncabined subjectivity. In particular, we can examine the ways that group membership, which shapes
both judges and the parties before them, might affect adjudication.
Sherrilyn Ifill, for example, has written a fascinating article on
whether and how we can understand judges to be representatives of
particular communities, connected by group-based characteristics and
interests. 70 Her paper confronts the ideal of the detached, impartial
judge with the real difference-tangible, but not ungovernable-that
group-based affiliation has made in many kinds of cases. 7 1 Helping
judges think through the relation of their own group-based identity to
their judicial role may encourage them to consider the group-based
social formation of other legal subjects.
All of these strategies involve some deployment of the rationalist's
tools: we can begin the dialogue in quasi-professional contexts that
65
This approach is detailed in Martha Minow, Words and theDoorto the Land of Change:
Law, Language, and Family Wolence 43 VAND. L. Riv. 1665, 1689-95 (1990).
66 See id. at 1689.
67 See id. at 1693.
68 See id. at 1694.
69 See McClain, supranote 61, at 1237.
70 See il, supra note 63.

71

See id.
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are less threatening to judges, create resting points on the slippery
slope that leads to unfathomable plurality or uncabinable judicial subjectivity, and highlight the conceptual or institutional breadth of the
liberal framework to which judges claim allegiance. Yet, there is a final set of factors shaping difference evasion, readily discoverable
through this modernist inquiry, that seems less predictably amenable
to the forces of reason.
We might describe these factors as political in nature. In the
same section of Bakke that betrays the impulse of pluralist panic, we
find this statement: "Not all of these groups can receive preferential
treatment and corresponding judicial tolerance of distinctions drawn
in terms of race and nationality, for then the only majority left would be a
new minority of White Anglo-Saxon Protestants."7 2 It is rare to find such an
overt statement of the political anxiety occasioned by a thorough-going recognition of difference, but I suspect that this anxiety is quite
prevalent. 73 Justice Powell rightly suggests that such recognition of
difference would create new entitlements and new ways of understanding equality and discrimination. More salient, though, is the
forceful expression of self-interest contained in Justice Powell's remark. A court that feels authorized to place such a perspectival statement at the heart of a landmark opinion either views self-interest as
the ultimate expression of reason or regards this expression of selfinterest as neutral-that is, not perspectival at all. In either case, such
a decision maker promises to be hard to reach through an appeal to
right reason. As Derrick Bell has argued, decision makers committed
to the defense of their group-based self-interest can be persuaded to
protect the interests of subordinated groups only when such protection converges with their own goals.7 4 Judges who regard defense of
their own privilege as a neutral undertaking will be even harder to
persuade, as they will view critical claims on behalf of outsider groups
as perspectival special pleading.7 5 Therefore, even strategic ap72

Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, at 295-96 (1978) (plurality

opinion) (emphasis added).
73 Other examples include Justice O'Connor's argument in City of Richmond v. JA.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 495-96 (1989), that Richmond's effort to correct decades-long
patterns of entrenched discrimination might best be understood as a black majority's efforts to help its own and turn the tables on the former white oppressors, and her suggestion in Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 648 (1993), that creating minority electoral districts
would generate a system wherein minority representatives might understand themselves as
representing only minority constituents and racial tensions would be exacerbated.
74 See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-ConvergenceDilemma, 93 HARv. L. RFv. 518, 524 (1980).
75 Legal theorists Daniel Farber and Suzanna Sherry, who are sometimes prepared to
characterize the courts' investment in the doctrinal status quo as neutrality, also evince this
view of much critical theory addressing questions of inequality. See FARBER & SHERRY, supra
note 18, at 36-37.
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proaches which begin with modernist premises may have to acknowledge the limits of reasoned argument directed to the courts.
C.

Postmodernist Strategies

For critical theorists who believe that judges are not persuadable-or not entirely persuadable-through reasoned argument, a different combination of approaches seems appropriate. Here, too, a
few examples may point the way toward a fuller set of strategies.
While the theorists and approaches examined below are distinguished
by their skepticism (or in some cases, their agnosticism) about the
value of rationalist, equality-based appeals to the judiciary, they also
manifest salient, if subtle, overlap with the rationalist strategies examined above. This overlap suggests that the modernistpostmodernist dichotomy may more accurately be described as a continuum, or a tension, between two related critical impulses.
Perhaps the most radical approach, exemplified by critical race
theorist Derrick Bell, favors contextually-based policy initiatives and
individually-enacted resistance strategies while renouncing equality76
based legal arguments. Bell concludes in his article, Racial Realism,

and his book, Faces at the Bottom of the Well,77 that it is not possible to
end racial inequality in this country, and that, in any case, courts are
not persuadable by any of the available legal arguments aimed at
equality.78 He argues that, instead of focusing on change through
legal equality claims, Blacks should engage in legal and policy intiatives aimed at ameliorating the material circumstances of Blacks and
in contextually-appropriate individual resistance strategies. Such
strategies are aimed, not at transcending inequality, but at improving
conditions preserving personal dignity, and achieving satisfaction in
nonacquiescence. 79 Critical theorists endorse such strategies both because they are usually feasible-there are opportunities for resistance
76

Bell, supra note 37.

77

DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE

BorroM

OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM

12

(1992) ("Black people will never gainfull equality in this county.").
78 See id.
79 Bell argues that the survival strategies of American slaves should serve as a model
for this resistance: "Knowing there was no escape, no way out, the slaves, nonetheless continued to engage themselves. To carve out a humanity. To defy the murder of selfhood.
Their lives were brutally shackled, certainly-but not without meaning despite being imprisoned" Id. at 197.
Individual resistance strategies are also advocated by postmodernist and poststructuralist scholars who emphasize the dispersal and circulation of power. Many
postmodernist and poststructumralist theorists cite Michel Foucault for this proposition. See
MICHEL FOUCAULT, TiffHisro y OF SEXUALrly 92-96 (Robert Hurley trans., Pantheon
Books 1978). For an interesting account that relates this Foucaltian insight about the dispersal and circulation of power to the stagewise evolution of pluralist accounts of democracy, see Kirstie McClure, On the Subject of Rights: Pluralism,Pluralityand PoliticalIdentity, in
DImENSIONS OF RADICAL DEMOCRACY 108 (Chantal Mouffe ed., 1992).
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even in the context of systematic oppression-and because their predictable consequences are not so small that they can be dismissed out
of hand-that is, one can never be certain, ex ante, how restricted or
extensive the effects of such resistance might be. Individual resistance
strategies have been particularly prevalent in the realm of cultural
production-the creation of liberatory erotica is one example 8° where the goal is to challenge the hegemonic force of dominant accounts of group-based difference and to offer new materials from
which dissonant images, and ultimately, new combinations, might
emerge.
Individual resistance strategies have also been embraced by those
who are less skeptical about reasoned appeals to the courts and more
sanguine (or at least more agnostic) about the possibilities of ultimate
transformation. These strategies vary from the modest to the elaborate, yet most of them share certain assumptions. They view the entrenched character ofjudicial difference evasion as a product of law's
intertwinement with other structures, institutions, cultural norms, and
practices. While these scholars may not all believe that shaping the
broader discursive environment will ultimately affect legal conceptualizations, they do share the belief that the continuity of law and other
norms and practices justifies legal scholars' move toward a more multifaceted approach. Their strategies thus involve expanding criticism
beyond the domain of legal doctrine to address these interrelated
structures. In some versions of her training programs, for example,
Martha Minow asks judges to read and discuss works of fiction reflecting critical perspectives on difference. 8 ' Minow's approach builds an
interesting bridge between the modem and the postmodern

82

: it com-

bines rationalist discussion with fictional accounts that aim to persuade, not solely or perhaps even primarily through the operation of
reason, but by "demonstrat[ing] common emotive ground"8 3 between
the reader and those "others" whose lives are depicted in the fictional
accounts. Outsider narratives, like other acts of resistant cultural production, seek to challenge dominant assumptions or articulate alternative assumptions that might ultimately displace them, or might be
combined with them, in novel and productive ways. These narratives
may be targeted specifically at judges-either in the course of litiga80

For a thoughtfifl and lively discussion of this potential mode of resistance, see Su-

san Keller, Viewing and Doing: ComplicatingPornography'sMeaning,81 GEo. L.J. 2195 (1993).
81 See Minow, supra note 63, at 1689-95.
82 I am grateful to Ali Nathan for this insight.
83
Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling Gender-Role Stereotypes, and LegalProtectionsfor Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 MIAM L. REv. 511, 521 (1992). Fajer
notes that "stories create empathy by convincing the listener that he is like the subject of
the story in some significant way-often through a shared experience of a powerful emotion or an important event." Id.
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tion 84 or through judicial training-or they may be offered to contest
and modify assumptions held by the greater society of which legal actors are a part.
Angela Harris, who seeks to engage the social norms that shape
law, advocates the creation of "resistance culture." 85 This form of
resistance involves several steps: "the self-conscious formation of identity groups that have been subject to racial oppression and now demand equality"; the "recovery and reworking of what has been lost or
suppressed concerning 'race' in legal doctrine and policy"; and the
"transform[ation] [of] existing jurisprudence and political [or social]
theory."8 6 According to Harris, these processes proceed not seriatim
by simultaneous processes, but work at different times in different
communities.8 7 The focus of much of this work is not on rationalist
persuasion, even at these wider social and cultural sites. The first
stage emphasizes the articulation of alternative norms and practices
reflecting the perspectives and experiences of outsider groups. The
second stage involves the excavation of submerged themes and patterns in dominant political and jurisprudential accounts-particularly
those ways in which an ostensibly neutral political system, comprised
of the interactions of autonomous agents, can create racialized subjects.88 The third stage, in which one transforms dominant norms and
theories, may involve persuasive efforts, 89 yet it may also occur as the
generation of alternative norms permits the formation of new conceptual frameworks that better reflect the realities of group-based difference. For Harris, who is subtly skeptical, but not entirely disillusioned
about the prospects of legal change, this cultural work may occur in
conjunction with more focused efforts at doctrinal reform. 90
84 Marc Fajer proposes using outsider narratives that contest legal decision makers'
dominant "pre-understandings" about gays and lesbians in the course of litigation. See id.
at 633-51.

85 Harris, supra note 2, at 763-66. Harris takes her inspiration for this approach from
the forms of cultural resistance described by Edward Said in the context of post-colonialism. See EDWARD SAID, CULTURE AND IMPFRALusM 209-20 (1993).

Harris, supra note 2, at 765-66.
See id. at 766.
88 See id. at 762.
89 Although Harris uses the distinction between modernism and postmodernism to
frame her discussion of the "Jurisprudence of Reconstruction" she views these characteristics as primary tendencies in individual works, and not as sharp dichotomies. Id. at 766. In
fact, she believes that many critical theorists-including, one assumes, herself-have both
rationalist and postrationalist tendencies in their work. See id. at 782 & n.202 (discussing
modernism and postmodernism in the work of Anthony Cook and Cornel West). She
regards the potential productivity of critical race theory as lying in its management of the
tension between modernism and postmodernism, hence she advocates jurisprudence of
"sophistication" (i.e., complicated modernism) and "disenchantment" (i.e., keeping a careful distance from the romanticization of reason). Id. at 766-85.
90 See id
86

87
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These strategies illustrate that even those who have become skeptical or uncertain about the prospects for reasoning with the courts
have aspirations and concrete resources for ameliorating group-based
inequalities in the legal context. Some theorists have been slow, however, to aim these strategies explicitly at judicial evasion of difference.
Highlighting this connection when it exists may perform a number of
useful functions. It may explain and help justify a nontraditional direction for legal analysis and scholarship, and may underscore the
self-knowledge and agency of critical scholars in a period of doctrinal
constraint. In emphasizing the interpretation of legal, social, and cultural norms, it also may challenge the presumption of legal autonomy
which is far too prevalent among legal scholars. The suggestion that
we identify our strategy in an explicit way reflects a bias toward communication-a modernist tendency paradoxically ensconced in a
postmodern proposal. Nevertheless, the future promise of critical
theories of inequality, as Harris has argued, may lie in creatively exploiting the tension between modernist and postmodernist
impulses.9 1
CONCLUSION
The articles in this Symposium offer a vivid glimpse into this paradoxical, yet potentially promising, moment in inequality theory. The
courts have thus far been resistant to increasingly variable and illuminating accounts of inequality. Yet acknowledging and exploring this
impasse represents the first step in a renewed effort, in which both
rationalist persuasion and broader strategies of culturally-based resistance may play a role.

91

See id.

